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REGULATION OF AIR COACH
SERVICE STANDARDS
By STANLEY BERGE
Professor of Transportation, Northwestern University School of
Commerce; Associate Editor of The Journal.
D ENIAL by the Civil Aeronautics Board on January 6, 1953 of
United Air Lines' petition for authority to reduce the number
of seats in DC-4 coach planes from 64 to 58 has raised two fundamental
questions. First, there is the question of safety standards in connection
with "high density" air coach operations. Second, there is the question
of economic policy in air coach service and to what extent the Civil
Aeronautics Board should interfere with the judgment of private air-
line management in fixing specific air coach rates and quality standards.
In view of the- rapid growth of air coach traffic not only in domestic
service but on the international routes, it is deemed desirable to give
consideration to the questions of safety and economic policy which
have been raised during the current United Air Lines-Civil Aeronautics
Board controversy.
History of the UAL-CAB Coach Seat Controversy
On December 6, 1951, the Board issued a statement of "Coach
Policy for the Certificated Domestic Carriers" urging expansion of air
coach services at fares approximating 4 cents per passenger mile. Two
types of coach service were advocated: (1) Fast, "high-density equip-
ment" without scheduling restrictions at fares less than 41/2 cents per
passenger mile; (2) Off-peak air coach service, not limited as to equip-
ment-fares not to exceed 4 cents per passenger mile.
The policy statement set specific minimums for high-density, coach
planes, as follows: DC-4 64 seats, DC-6 68 seats, and Constellation 79
seats. The Board further stated that it would establish minimum seat-
ing density for other aircraft types in connection with specific carrier
proposals and said:
"It should be noted that the above minimum seating densities
represent the minimum from air economic standpoint, while the
maximum will be predicated on safety considerations."
On November 24, 1952 United Air Lines advised the civil air
agencies that it was voluntarily reducing the number of passengers
carried in DC-4 coach planes from 64 to 54 on the grounds that five-
abreast seating, narrow aisles, and inadequate emergency exits subjected
passengers to serious safety hazards. In a statement to the press W. A.
Patterson, president of the company said: "Research has indicated that
in the event of a landing or take-off accident, high-density loading
might cause undue congestion and thereby create a safety hazard."
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It was indicated that United had reached this conclusion from reports
based on a series of tests conducted jointly by United and the Cornell
Foundation, the Air Force, and the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics.
On December 24, 1952 United petitioned the Board requesting it
to reconsider its "Coach Policy" to "permit the operation of coach
services at presently published coach fares with DC-4 type aircraft
having a minimum density of 58 passenger seats" (four abreast seating
with wider aisle).
On January 6, 1953 the Board issued an order denying United's
petition stating that "the practice of selling only 54 seats on coach
flights is contrary to United's tariff, violates Section 403 (b) of the Act,
and should therefore be discontinued immediately."
The Board further stated:
"Under the Board's decisions and policy, the seating density
standards of coaches are related to the service offered. By regularly
selling 10 seats less than the number specified in its tariff on coach
flights, United is able to offer coach service superior to that offered
by other carriers who observe their own tariffs. The competitive ad-
vantage secured by this practice may constitute an unfair method
of competition in violation of Section 411 of the Act ...
"The Board's policy with respect to seating density on coaches
was established for the purpose of promoting adequate and eco-
nomical air service-to make mass air transportation at low cost
an effective reality. The achievement of this goal depended on pro-
viding service at lowest cost reasonably attainable by the industry
as a whole; and the requisite low cost service could be assured only
by setting minimum density standards for the industry at levels
that would result in low unit cost consistent with comfort and
safety.
"The lowered seating density involved in United's proposals
would undoubtedly raise the unit cost of and diminish the revenue
from coach services making such service less economic, thus cutting
off numerous cities and many passengers from the possibilities of
low cost air transportation. ...
"The competitive impact of permitting United to offer reduced
seating on its coaches would probably force other carriers to follow
suit and render similar service. This in turn would tend to make
coach service uneconomic and impossible on many routes of other
carriers or require higher coach fares. Such a general result might
well hinder, delay, and even make impossible the expansion of low
cost air transportation, a development which the public interest
demands and which it is the Board's duty to promote.
"On the basis of all available information, including the data
presented by United, a seating density of 64 persons on DC-4 air-
craft provides an adequate margin of safety and comfort ......
W. A. Patterson, president of United Air Lines, replied to the
Board's denial in full-page advertisements, carried during the following
week in metropolitan newspapers, which included the following state-
ments:
"While the additional passengers did not tax the lift capacity
of the plane, our safety engineers raised the question as to whether
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or not our patrons in the coach airplane were provided adequate
protection for emergency evacuation.
"We therefore conducted extensive tests which convinced us
that we were not fulfilling our obligation to the public. To check
our own findings we sought the counsel of outside independent
agencies, including the National Fire Protection Association and
the Flight Safety Foundation. Our previous conclusions were con-
firmed.
"As a result, we immediately reduced the DC-4 maximum load
from 66 passengers to 54 and ordered the removal of the center
seats to provide wider aisles .....
"We presented our findings to the CAB, although we were not,
we assure you, attempting to impose our views on any other airline
or any government agency.
"To comply with the law, we then sought approval from the
CAB to continue our service with fewer seats, at the same fare. It
was our business judgment that our revenue from the operation
would be less than previously, but there would be a profit.
"The CAB disagreed with us on both the points of safety and
economics-stating that the safety factors of the higher density
seating are adequate, and that United's plan is economically
unsound."
The Question of Air Coach Safety Standards
The joint responsibility for safe operations resting upon the airlines
themselves and upon the Civil Aeronautics Board is clearly stated in
Section 601 (b) of the Act, as follows:
"In prescribing standards, rules and regulations . . . the Board
shall give full consideration to the duty resting upon air carriers
to perform their services with the highest possible degree of safety
in the public interest .... (Italics supplied.)
"The Board shall exercise and perform its powers and duties
under this Act in such a manner as will best tend to reduce or
eliminate the possibility of, or recurrence of, accidents in air
transportation ......
There are clearly two distinct requirements in aviation safety: (1)
accidents must be prevented by every possible means, and (2) the
chances of survival by means of prompt evacuation and rescue in the
event of accident must be protected.
As pointed out by United in its petition to the Board, "accidents
where survival is possible constitute the major portion of air transport
accidents." This is indicated by the fact that in 235 majoi accidents
since January 1948, in domestic and international service, 114 pas-
sengers were killed and 208 injured, although 1,367 passengers were
actually involved in the accidents. Prompt evacuation and rescue
operations become especially urgent in the event of accidents involving
fire-and it is significant to note in this connection that 36 percent of
the major accidents since 1948 were accompanied by fire immediately
afterward. High-density seating and narrow aisles tend to increase
the possibility of panic and congestion and to reduce the opportunity
for prompt evacuation and rescue.
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Jerome Lederer of the Flight Safety Foundation has expressed the
view that "high-density aircraft (tourist class) are going to provide a
problem. . . . When you crowd 85 or so passengers into a plane that
normally accommodates say 60 persons, I am afraid that there is going
to be some very sad experience if fire follows a crash." (Quoted in
United Airlines' petition.)
George H. Tryon III, of the National Fire Protection Association,
has written as follows to United Air Lines' Assistant Director of Safety:
(Quoted in the UAL petition.)
"Our Association is greatly concerned over the present trend
toward high-density occupancy of existing aircraft from the point
of view of safety following impact accidents involving fire ...
"... it is our opinion that the increased occupancy authoriza-
tions permitted under Special Civil Air Regulation SR-387 (effec-
tive October 27, 1952) are a threat to public safety which should be
energetically opposed by all concerned with safeguarding the lives
of those who use the commercial airlines as an instrument of public
transportation.
"Fortunately, we have not had a serious crash fire accident in-
volving aircraft with high-density seatingat an airport up to this
date, but if 7 of the 28 occupants of the National Airlines aircraft
which crashed in Philadelphia could not escape unassisted, it is
frightening to contemplate what the toll might have been if the
aircraft had been carrying a full load of 86 as authorized for the
DC-4 under SR-387."
It is clear from the above that the question of adequate safety
standards for air coach service is one which involves the joint responsi-
bility of the Federal civil aviation agencies and of private airline
managements. Having studied the matter and reached the conclusion
that its DC-4 air coach planes with 66 seats were unduly hazardous in
the event of accidents involving impact-fires, it seems logical to con-
clude that United Air Lines was properly performing its duty under
Section 601 (b) of the Act when it took steps to reduce the seating
capacity of its DC-4 planes to 54. For United to have continued high-
density operations under the circumstances would have represented
dereliction of its duty as defined by Section 601 (b) of the Act.
This is not to imply that all so-called "high density" air coach equip-
ment is necessarily hazardous. Provision of additional emergency exits
and special training of crews are factors which may to some extent
offset the 3 against 2 high-density seating arrangement. But as pointed
out in the foregoing, the safety question deserves careful scrutiny if
high-density air coach service is to continue its rapid expansion. Inten-
sive research on emergency evacuation and rescue techniques at this
time may make it possible to avoid learning lessons by disastrous
experience.
The Question of Economic Policy for Air Coach Service
The second question raised by the UAL-CAB air coach controversy
involves the determination of economic standards for air coach service.
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The Board contends that United's reduced seating density would
"diminish the revenue from coach services.. and would tend to make
coach service uneconomic and impossible on many routes of other
carriers or require higher coach fares." In short, the Board, having ap-
parently set a target rate of 4 cents per passenger mile for domestic
air coach service, believes it necessary to exercise control over the
specific conduct of the service in order to make its price policy effective.
The economic policy problem involved in the coach controversy
became quite apparent January 22, 1953, when Eastern Air Lines
asked the Board to correct what it termed an unfair competitive ad-
vantage in air coach service granted operators of Douglas aircraft over
those flying Lockheed Constellations. Eastern's petition opposed
United's application for 54-seat air coach service in DC-4 equipment
stating that "actually United's proposal is solely and simply to increase
the attractiveness of its coach service by allotting more room to each
passenger."
By declaring a specific economic policy for air coach service, the
Civil Aeronautics Board has placed itself in the difficult position of
assuming two basic managerial functions-specifically, pricing and
determination of service standards-which in most American business
enterprises are considered to be the prerogatives of private manage-
ment. There is, of course, no question that the Board has been given
broad powers for economic regulation of the air carriers under Title
IV of the Act. Economic regulation includes control over the right
to enter the air transport industry by the granting or denying of
certificates of public convenience and necessity or permits to engage
in interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation. In the second
instance the Board is given the power to prescribe or approve rates
and practices of air carriers and to fix the rate of compensation for
the transportation of mail in aircraft. The Board's power to regulate
airline rates follows the general precedent established under the Inter-
state Commerce Act, namely power to establish maximum rates, mini-
mum rates, and to prescribe the actual rates for any type of common
carrier airplane transportation. Obviously under these powers the
Board can prescribe air coach rates or refuse to approve any rates with
which it does not agree. Economic regulation by the Civil Aeronautics
Board also includes authority to prevent unjust discrimination, prefer-
ence, and prejudice, and to prevent unfair or deceptive competitive
practices in air transportation.
Air transportation is therefore subject to economic regulation that
goes far beyond the controls exercised by the Government over ordi-
nary business enterprises. Air transportation is subject to these controls
on the general public utility theory that business "affected with a
public interest" shall be subject to special public regulation. But while
the Civil Aeronautics Board possesses comprehensive power much in
the same manner as the Interstate Commerce Commission possesses
comprehensive power to regulate interstate surface carriers, it does
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not follow that the Board needs to exercise all of the powers it possesses.
In short, the power to regulate air transportation does not imply a
mandate from the Congress to take over the management of the air
carrier industry. Yet, there are indications that in developing its cur-
rent "Coach Policy" the Board is actually assuming several of the
primary prerogatives of private management in common carrier air
transportation.
In his book, Government Control of Business (1941), Harold D.
Koontz calls attention to the difficulties of price control by the Govern-
ment as follows:
"The difficulties of price control have led to additional regula-
tions. . . . Indeed, once the government undertakes to regulate
prices, the way is open, through the sheer necessity of making price
regulation effective, to bring under control many practices of
management and labor." (p. 899)
Development of the Board's Air Coach Policy
The history of the Air Coach Policy of the Civil Aeronautics Board
through the year 1950 was outlined in an article entitled "The 'Air
Coach' Experiment and National Air Transport Policy" by Harold
A. Jones and Frederick Davis, published in the Journal in two parts.'
Jones and Davis attributed some influence to the non-scheduled air-
lines to inaugurate a second class of low-cost air coach service shortly
after World War II. Capital Air Lines apparently was the first of the
major trunk lines to file a tariff proposing the inauguration of coach-
type service between New York and Chicago via Pittsburgh. Capital
proposed to sell the service at a fare of 4 cents per mile as compared
with the standard fare of 6 cents. To justify the difference in rate, the
flights were to be operated with 60-passenger DC-4 aircraft (which
Jones and Davis termed a "high-density" seating arrangement) with
midnight departure from each terminal and cutting out such frills
as free meals and extra stewardesses. The Board gave temporary ap-
proval and service was begun November 4, 1948. TWA followed and
received the Board's "blessing" on DC-3 night air coach service having
24 seats instead of the usual 21 and operating over a local route with
several intermediate stops.
Meanwhile various other coach tariff proposals were filed by other
airlines and the Board issued a policy statement September 7, 1949,
specifying the conditions which it considered to be necessary as a guide
to the evaluation of coach proposals at approximately a 4 cent fare
level:
(a) Conduct operations over heavy-traffic routes.
(b) Use high-density equipment (equipment having more than
the average number of seats for that type of aircraft).
(c) Schedule service so as to minimize traffic diversion from reg-
ular flights.
1 Winter 1950, Vol. 17, No. 1, and Autumn 1950, Vol. 17, No. 4.
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(d) Cut out all non-essential service to passengers such as meals,
extra stewardesses, full reservation procedures, etc.
About the same time the Board decided that air coach service could
not be conducted successfully with DC-3 aircraft due to the extremely
high load factor necessary to cover operating costs at a 4 cent fare.
Proposals of Capital for 50-seat service and National for 46-seat coach
service in DC-4s were disapproved because of failure, to specify high-
density equipment. In this connection it may be noted that most DC-4
air coach services approved by the Board to date have had seating
arrangements ranging from 55 to 73 seats.
A distinctly new "wrinkle" then entered the air coach "experiment'
when American Air Lines proposed to operate daytime 70-seat high-
density DC-6 air coach service as compared with 52-seat standard serv-
ice. The economic argument was that coach fares on a base rate of 4.47
cents per passenger mile with 70 seats would give the same plane-mile
revenue, assuming equal load factors as the standard rate of 6 cents
per mile with 52 seats. The Board decided to approve this operation
and subsequently approved a similar arrangement for TWA using
high-density Constellations.
Thus Member Jones of the Civil Aeronautics Board and his as-
sistant, Mr. Davis, outlined the history of the Board's "Coach Policy"
to January 1950. The fears of the Board at the time were expressed
by Messrs. Jones and Davis as follows:
"Nothing could be more damaging to the financial welfare of
industry than indiscriminate extensions of coach operations with-
out regard to their effect on the financial position of the industry...
if not carefully controlled, coach operations might lead to a costly
price war which could destroy the financial soundness of the entire
domestic air transport system."'2
It is clear from the above that the Board has assumed a' paternalistic
point of view with respect to its "charges" in the air transportation in-
dustry. The historical objective of Government regulation to protect
the public has given way to an emphatic policy of protecting the air
carriers from each other and from their own errors. This is distinctly a
far cry from the conception of the Federal Government's functions ex-
pressed by President Thomas Jefferson in his inaugural address in the
year 1801: ". .. a wise and frugal government which shall restrain men
from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate
their own pursuits of industry and improvement .... "
The Role of Competition in Air Transportation
Perhaps the most serious objection to broadening the scope of
government beyond the Jeffersonian concept into present day govern-
ment paternalism as embodied in the Board's "Air Coach Policy" is
that normal economic competition fails to operate. Unless airline
2 17 J. Air L. and C., p. 12.
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management is left relatively free to design and price a variety of
services in accord with its own judgment and stand by the consequences,
our air transportation development will lack one of the greatest in-
centives for continuous improvement of service and reduction of rates.
One observer cites six functions of competition in transportation:*
(1) Bring about the lowest possible rates.
(2) Promote maximum service consistent with the- rate charged.
(3) Provide a rate that will permit a remunerative return on the
bulk of the capital invested.
(4) Eliminate the inefficient transport operator.
(5) Eliminate excessive or unused transportation facilities.
(6) Encourage the creation of facilities where needed.
The Congress has set a broad policy of competition to the extent
necessary to assure the sound development of an air transportation
system. Reasonable competition has been fostered in the conviction
that it is necessary in order to secure the optimum development of air
transportation service. Competition must be constructive in character
and must not result in lowering the safety factor or in precluding co-
operative arrangements which may result in efficiency and economy.
(Air Coordinating Committee, statement, Aug. 1, 1947.)
The Civil Aeronautics Act prohibits air carriers from engaging. in
unfair competition with each other and from using unfair or deceptive
practices. Since the complaint of Eastern Air Lines refers to unfair
competition in the UAL-CAB coach controversy, it may be of interest
to examine the nature of unfair or deceptive competitive practices
which have been condemned by the Federal Trade Commission in
the course of hundreds of cases involving unfair trade practices. A
number of specific types of such practices were enumerated in the 1939
Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission (pp. 82-89). Promi-
nent among some thirty types of unfair. competitive practices were
the following:
(1) Use of false and misleading advertising.
(2) Misbranding.
(3) Misappropriation or simulation of well-known trade-names,
labels or packaging.
(4) Selling second-hand products as new.
(5) Bribing buyers and employees of customers to secure patron-
age.
(6) Making false and disparaging statements respecting com-
petitors' products and business.
(7) Combinations or agreements of competitors to enhance or
maintain prices, or divide territory, or cut off competitors'
source of supply, or otherwise restrain free and fair competi-
tion.
In the light of the foregoing, United Air Line's proposal for reduc-
tion of seat density in its DC-4 air coach planes hardly seems to consti-
tute an unfair competitive practice.
* Waters, R.H., Competition in Transportation, (1938) p. 28.
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In its petition to reduce its DC-4 coach seating arrangement to a
pattern of 4-abreast seating with 58 passengers, United Air Lines pre-
sented cost data showing that on an incremental cost basis, using
figures for the first nine months of 1952, a load factor of only 24.8
percent would be needed to break even at current coach fares. On a
fully-allocated cost basis United estimates that a 61.4 percent load
factor would be needed, or on a 58-seat plane a minimum of 35 pas-
sengers would cover fully-allocated costs. To sum up its economic argu-
ment, United pointed out that it had carried an average of more than
35 passengers per flight on its coach service during the past year. Hence,
argues the carrier, there is every basis for believing that the 58-seat
coach plane would be profitable. Furthermore, in its denial the Board
made no contention that United's reduced seating plan would be
non-compensatory.
It seems to the writer that perhaps the Board's "Coach Policy"
should be liberalized to the extent of permitting variations both in
the price and detailed specifications of air coach service. Perhaps it
may be desirable to have several variations in coach-class traffic where
the rate would vary with the nature of the equipment and service
offered, characteristics of the route served, time of the flight, and other
factors. Perhaps the present "target rate" of 4 cents per passenger mile
for air coach is too specific, for to make such a price policy effective it
seems to be necessary for the Board to prescribe detailed specifications
for the service itself and thus more and more of the normal prerogatives
of private business management must be taken over by the regulatory
agency.
Yet, while standard airline fares have been made fairly uniform,
it is noted that there is considerable variation in "regular service"
seating arrangements. For instance, at the present time Eastern Air
Lines' Super Constellation at regular fares carries 88 seats, while
American Air Lines' Super Constellations at regular fares carries only
64 seats (plus 7 lounge seats which are not sold). With the smaller
Constellation at regular fares Eastern provides 60 seats, American 57
seats, and Capital 55 seats. Using the DC-6, United provides 50 seats
plus six lounge seats which are not sold, while American provides 52
seats. On the other hand, on the DC-6B, which is four feet longer,
United provides 58 seats plus six lounge seats not sold, while American
provides only 52 seats. Perhaps the widest variation in regular service
seating arrangements is found in the case of the DC-4 where according
to a compilation published in American Aviation April 28, 1952, DC-4s
were operated as follows: United and PAA (Latin American Division)
44, Panagra 46, Delta 48, Northwest, National and California Central
50, Colonial 52, Eastern 60, and U.S. Overseas 65.
Very clearly from the above facts, which are admittedly only a
sample, there is no uniformity in the seating arrangements provided
under regular airline fares. Is there any more reason why air coach
seating arrangements should be held to a uniform pattern?
